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Secure Recovery Procedure for Manufacturing
Systems using Synchronizing Automata and
Supervisory Control Theory
L. V. R. Alves, P. N. Pena
Abstract—Manufacturing systems may be subject to external
attacks and failures, so it is important to deal with the recovery
of the system after these situations. This paper deals with the
problem of recovering a manufacturing system, modeled as a
Discrete Event System (DES) using the Supervisory Control
Theory (SCT), when the control structure, called supervisor,
desynchronizes from the physical plant. The desynchronization
may be seen as plant and supervisor being in uncorresponding
states. The recovery of the system may be attained if there is
a word, the synchronizing word, that regardless the state of
each one of them, brings the system and supervisor back to
a known state. The concepts of synchronizing automata are used
to do so. In this paper we show under what conditions a set of
synchronizing plants and specifications leads to a synchronizing
supervisor obtained by the Supervisory Control Theory. The
problem is extended to cope with multiple supervisors, proposing
a local recovery when possible. We also present a simple way
to model problems, composed of machines and buffers, as
synchronizing automata such that it is always possible do restore
synchronization between the control (supervisor) and the plant.
Note to Practitioners—Given the unpredictability of faults
and malicious attacks occurring in industrial systems, recovery
strategies are crucial for a harmonic operation of the plant. The
possibility of leading the system to a known state, recovering
control, is of extreme importance to the safety of industrial
processes. The method proposed in this paper uses well known
concepts of Supervisory Control Theory (SCT) of Discrete Event
Systems (DES), introducing the recovery process (using recovery
events) in the modeling phase such that it is possible to isolate
and fix only the part of the control system subject to the fault.
The result of the proposed approach allows the implementation
of such control system with the recovery procedure directly in
the Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs).
Index Terms—Discrete Event Systems, Synchronizing Au-
tomata, Supervisory Control Theory, Recovery Procedure.
I. INTRODUCTION
Fault recovery is an essential part of a modern manufactur-
ing system. Most of the data in Smart Plants is accessed over
real-time communication networks, so, in addition to worrying
about sensor and actuator failures, we also need to take into
account malicious attacks to the system. In computational
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systems, such problems can be solved restarting the software,
but in industries, because of safety and reliability constraints,
this restart cannot be naive [1].
In the Supervisory Control Theory (SCT), the supervisor
restricts the dynamics of the system inhibiting the execution
of controllable events in order to guarantee a safe operation
of the system. As shown in Fig. 1, the supervisor estimates
the current state of the plant by observing the occurrence of
events, however this observation is susceptible to problems
originated by malicious attacks and communication problems,
leading the system to a situation where the physical state of
the plant does not correspond to the state estimated by the
supervisor. In some situations, the observations made by the
supervisor can be corrupted as the list of allowed events sent
to the plant.
Starting in the decade of 2000, the increase in the exchange
of information in digital environment increases the concern
with the security of computational systems [2]. Every system
with communication among its agents, as between plant and
supervisor, is susceptible to attacks.
Such attacks are becoming more sophisticated having as
their main objectives to steal information, extortion and sab-
otage [3], [4]. APT - Advanced Persistent Threat are pieces
of software developed to attack specific targets [5] and stay
hidden in these systems for long periods of time.
Another cause of problems in manufacturing systems are
the failures in sensors, actuators and communication systems.
Most of the information that travels in intelligent manufactur-
ing systems is accessed by real time communication networks
[6] and this information may be corrupted or lost.
The problems of recovery of Discrete Event Systems can
be divided into three sub-problems [7]:
1) Detection: Consists in detecting discrepancies between
the state of the system and the specifications/supervisor
[8].
2) Diagnostic: Consists in detecting the fault that generated
the discrepancy. In DES, this problem may be handled
using techniques of diagnosability using automata mod-
els of Discrete Event Systems [9].
3) Recovery: After eliminating the cause of the fault, the
malicious agent or faulty parts, the recovery may be
about changing the state of the system and supervisor
to be consistent.
Shu [10] deals with the recovery of manufacturing systems
firing recovery events when an event sequence leads the system
to a faulty mode. These recovery events cannot be disabled
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Fig. 1: System under attack or failure
by the supervisor and they are used by the supervisor in
order to recover the system. On the other hand, Andersson
and coauthors [11]–[13], Bergagard and coauthors [14], [15]
present a method to restart manufacturing systems, modeled
using operations and coordination of operations (COP), after
unforeseen errors using the notion of restart states. In this
context, the restart process act by resynchronizing the physical
state of a plant with the state of COP.
In this paper, we propose the use of the theoretical devel-
opment in Synchronizing Automata to deal with the problem
when the active state of the plant does not match the active
state of the supervisor, after the system suffers an attack of
a malicious agent or after a fault. In this sense, we consider
that the system loses synchronization when the active control
state does not correspond to the active physical state.
Differently from the techniques presented in [11]–[15], if it
is possible to model the system components as synchronizing
automata then it is always possible to restart the system,
and there is no need to insert additional components. We,
also, present a simple method to model conventional problems
of SCT as synchronizing automata inserting recovery events,
similar to those presented in [10].
An automaton is said synchronizing when there is a word,
called synchronizing word, that, when executed by the automa-
ton, leads to the same state, regardless of the state of origin. So,
two identical automata, in different states, will always evolve
to the same state when a synchronizing word is executed [16].
The existence of a synchronizing word has applications in
many fields, such as robotics, assembling, loading and packing
of products [17], [18]. More theoretical development was
presented in the context of industrial automation [19]–[21].
Synchronizing automata were also applied to problems with
partial observability [22] and problems modeled with Petri
Nets [23]–[26].
The contributions of the paper are summarized. First, we
present how the synchronizing automata coexist with the
Supervisory Control Theory and in which cases the synchro-
nization is maintained after the synthesis of a controllable and
nonblocking supervisor. Then, we show how to turn automata
that model the plants and specifications into synchronizing
automata using recovery events (alike [10]) and how they
can be used to resynchronize supervisor and plant. Then, we
expand the obtained results to Local Modular Supervisory
Control, allowing partial recovery of the system, pointed out
as a future challenge in [13].
This paper is organized such that Section II has the prelimi-
naries, where we show the main concepts needed to understand
the results. Section III states the problem this paper aims to
solve. Section IV presents the main results, where we present
conditions under which synchronization survives the syntheses
of supervisors in both in the Monolithic Supervisory Control
and the Local Modular Supervisory Control. In Section V, an
example is presented showing how synchronizing automata
can be used in discrete event systems. The conclusions are in
Section VI.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we summarize some fundamental concepts
and results of the Supervisory Control Theory (SCT) of
Ramadge and Wonham [27], that are needed for the theoretical
development of the paper. We, also, define some concepts and
notation on the synchronizing automata.
A. Languages and Automata
Let Σ be a finite nonempty set of events, referred to as
an event set. Behaviors of DES are modeled by finite words
over Σ. The set of all finite words composed of events in Σ,
including the empty word ε, is denoted by Σ∗. A subset L ⊆
Σ∗ is called a language. The concatenation of words s, u ∈ Σ∗
is written as su. A word s ∈ Σ∗ is called a prefix of t ∈ Σ∗,
written s ≤ t, if there exists u ∈ Σ∗ such that su = t. The
prefix-closure L of a language L ⊆ Σ∗ is the set of all prefixes
of words in L, i.e., L = { s ∈ Σ∗ | s ≤ t for some t ∈ L }.
A common operation over words and languages is the
natural projection. Given two event sets Σ and Σi, such that
Σi ⊆ Σ, the natural projection PΣ→Σi : Σ
∗ → Σ∗i is defined
as:
PΣ→Σi (ǫ) = ǫ
PΣ→Σi (σ) =
{
σ if σ ∈ Σi
ǫ if σ ∈ Σ \ Σi
PΣ→Σi (sσ) = PΣ→Σi(s)PΣ→Σi (σ), s ∈ Σ
∗, σ ∈ Σ.
The inverse projection maps a word built from an event set
Σi to a language in the event set Σ as:
P−1
Σ→Σi
(t) = {s ∈ Σ∗ |PΣ→Σi(s) = t}.
Both operations can be extended to operate over languages.
For L ⊆ Σ∗:
PΣ→Σi (L) = {t ∈ Σ
∗
i | (∃s ∈ L) [PΣ→Σi (s) = t]}.
For L ⊆ Σ∗i :
P−1
Σ→Σi
(L) = {s ∈ Σ∗ | (∃t ∈ PΣ→Σi(L)) [PΣ→Σi (s) = t]}.
Definition 1. A Deterministic Finite Automata (DFA) is a 5-
tuple G = (Q,Σ, δ, q0, Qm), where Q is a finite set of states,
Σ is an event set, δ : Q × Σ → Q is the transition function,
q0 ∈ Q is the initial state and Qm ⊆ Q is the set of marked
states.
The transition function can be extended to recognize words
over Σ∗ as δ(q, σs) = q′ with δ(q, σ) = x and δ(x, s) = q′.
3The execution of a word s in a state q, δ(q, s), is denoted by
the concatenation q.s. The same notation is used to represent
this operation over sets. The notation A.s denotes the set of
destination states when the word s is executed from the set of
states A ⊆ Q.
The active event function, defined by Γ : Q→ 2Σ, is, given
a state q, the set of events σ ∈ Σ for which δ(q, σ) is defined.
The generated and marked languages are, respectively,
L(G) = {s ∈ Σ∗|q0.s = q′ ∧ q′ ∈ Q} and Lm(G) =
{s ∈ Σ∗|q0.s = q′ ∧ q′ ∈ Qm}. Another language is
defined to include words starting in any state q of G as
LG(q) = {s ∈ Σ∗|q.s = q′ ∧ q, q′ ∈ Q} such that
LG(q0) = L(G). An automaton is said to be nonblocking
if Lm(G) = L(G).
Definition 2. Let G1 = (Q1,Σ1, δ1, q01, Qm1) and G2 =
(Q2,Σ2, δ2, q02, Qm2) be two automata. The parallel compo-
sition of G1 and G2, denoted by G12 = G1||G2 is:
G12 = (Q1 ×Q2,Σ1 ∪ Σ2, δ12, (q01, q02), Qm1 ×Qm2)
where
δ((q1, q2), σ) =


(δ1(q1, σ), δ2(q2, σ)), if σ ∈ Γ1(q1) ∩ Γ2(q2)
(δ1(q1, σ), q2), if σ ∈ Γ1(q1)\Σ2
(q1, δ2(q2, σ)), if σ ∈ Γ2(q2)\Σ1
undefined, otherwise.
Also, let PΣ1∪Σ2→Σ1 : (Σ1∪Σ2)
∗ → Σ∗1 and PΣ1∪Σ2→Σ2 :
(Σ1 ∪ Σ2)
∗ → Σ∗2 be natural projections:
L(G12) = P
−1
Σ1∪Σ2→Σ1
(L(G1)) ∩ P
−1
Σ1∪Σ2→Σ2
(L(G2))
Lm(G12) = P
−1
Σ1∪Σ2→Σ1
(Lm(G1)) ∩ P
−1
Σ1∪Σ2→Σ2
(Lm(G2)).
B. Supervisory Control Theory
The Supervisory Control Theory is a formal method, based
on language and automata theory, to the systematic calculus of
supervisors [28]. The system to be controlled is called plant,
the controller agent is called supervisor and the control prob-
lem is to find a supervisor which enforces the specifications
in a minimally restrictive way. The plant is modeled by an
automaton G = ( ,Σ, , , ) and Σ = Σc ∪ Σu where Σc is
the set of controllable events, which can be disabled by an
external agent, and Σu is the set of uncontrollable events,
which cannot be disabled by an external agent. The plant
represents the logical model of the DES, the system behavior
under no control action. The supervisor’s S role is to regulate
the plant behavior to meet a desired behavior K disabling
controllable events.
Let E be an automaton that represents the specification
imposed on G. We say that K = Lm(G ‖ E) ⊆ Lm(G)
is controllable w.r.t. G if KΣuc ∩L(G) ⊆ K . A nonblocking
supervisor V for G such that Lm(V/G) = K exists if and
only if K is controllable w.r.t. G. If K does not satisfy the
condition, then the supremal controllable and nonblocking
sublanguage Sup C(K,G) can be synthesized. It represents
the least restrictive nonblocking supervisor. For G and K , a
monolithic supervisor automaton S can be computed to rep-
resent Sup C(K,G) such that Lm(S) = Sup C(K,G) ⊆ K .
The generated and marked language of a plant G under
the action of a supervisor S are, respectively, L(S/G) and
Lm(S/G) ⊆ L(S/G).
The space explosion of the monolithic supervisor synthesis
can be avoided using decentralized techniques, as the Local
Modular Supervisory Control [29] where one supervisor is
synthesized for each specification, and each one of the super-
visors has only a partial view of the plant. The global plant
G is composed of n sub-plants Hi, i ∈ {1 . . . n}, such that
their event sets ΣHi are disjoint and G = ||
n
i=1Hi, also the
global specification E is composed of m sub-specifications
Ej , j ∈ {1 . . .m}, such that their event sets are represented
by ΣEj and E = ||
m
j=1Ej . A local plant Gj is such that
Gj = ||a∈AjHa with Aj = {i ∈ {1 . . . n}|ΣHi ∩ ΣEj 6= ∅}.
In the Local Modular Control, the local supervisor Sj =
Sup C(Kj, Gj), where Kj = Lm(Gj ‖ Ej). Each supervisor
is nonblocking by construction, but their combined behaviour
has to be nonblocking in order to have the same behavior
than the monolithic control solution. To check if supervisors
are nonconflicting, the equality in (1) must be verified.
||mj=1Lm(Sj) = Lm(||
m
j=1Sj). (1)
C. Synchronizing Automata
The original definition of a synchronizing automaton [16]
is presented and the idea is extended to be used in the context
of Supervisory Control Theory. A synchronizing deterministic
finite automaton is a DFA that has a word that, when executed
from any state of the automaton, leads to a known state.
Definition 3. [16] A complete automaton G = (Q,Σ, δ, , )
is synchronizing if and only if for any pair of states q, q′ ∈ Q
there exists a word w ∈ Σ∗, called synchronizing word, such
that q.w = q′.w, ∀q, q′ ∈ Q.
A complete automaton in the definition refers to an au-
tomaton with a complete transition function, that is, transitions
labeled with all the events in the event set are available in each
state. Also, the initial state is irrelevant to the original property,
so it is intentionally omitted in the following example.
Example 1. Consider the synchronizing automaton A =
(Q,Σ, , , ) of Fig. 2. The word w = ab3ab3a leads the
automaton to state 1, regardless the origin state. Using the
notation established before, Q.w = 1, Q = {0, 1, 2, 3}. It is
straightforward that any word sw, s ∈ Σ∗, also leads the
automaton to state 1.
If the word w is a synchronizing word, the operation Q.w
results in a singleton set. Also, the set of all synchronizing
words of an automaton G is denoted by Syn(G):
Syn(G) = {w ∈ Σ∗| |Q.w| = 1}.
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Let G be a manufacturing system modeled as a discrete
event system under supervision of a supervisor S, obtained
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Fig. 2: Example 1- Conventional synchronizing automaton
[16].
through Supervisory Control Theory, S ⊆ Lm(G). Consider
that such control system (plant and supervisor) lose synchro-
nization due to a failure or an attack. In such a case, ∃s ∈ Σ∗,
∃σ ∈ Σ, such that sσ ∈ Lm(G)∩S, however, due to a failure
or attack, the transition with σ is not “communicated” to the
supervisor and the current state of the plant does not match
the state estimated by the supervisor. Propose a method to
resynchronize the control system (plant and supervisor), based
on synchronizing automata.
IV. MAIN RESULTS
The main idea of this work is to adapt the Supervisory Con-
trol Theory to deal with synchronizing automata, such that the
features of this model can be used to solve desynchronization
that may be caused by attacks or failures. In order to do so,
we organize this section into four subsections. First we extend
the concept of synchronizing automata to a more specific class
that is the synchronizing automata w.r.t. the initial state and
present some properties (Section IV-A). Then, we present how
synchronizing automata w.r.t. the initial state behave under
some automata operations (Section IV-B) and we show how
these automata can be used in the context of Supervisory
Control Theory (Section IV-C). Finally, we present a method to
model conventional DES problems as synchronizing automata
w.r.t. the initial state (Section IV-D).
A. Basic Definitions
When modeling a system, it is common to use partial
transition functions and work with the language starting at
the initial state. So, the idea of synchronization makes more
sense when defined in relation to the initial state. In Definition
4 a new class of synchronizing automata is presented, the
synchronizing automata w.r.t. the initial state. In this new
definition of synchronicity, the initial state cannot be omitted.
Definition 4. An automaton G = (Q,Σ, , q0, ) is synchro-
nizing w.r.t. the initial state if there exists a word w ∈ Σ∗,
called synchronizing word, such that Q.w = {q0}.
In words, G is a synchronizing automata w.r.t. the initial
state if for any state q ∈ Q of G, there is a word w such that
q.w = q0. The set of synchronizing words w.r.t. the initial
state of an automaton G is represented by Synq0(G). In order
to simplify the notation, we define that Synq0(G) = I .
Example 2. Let A = ( ,Σ1, , , ) be an automaton with
two states, in Fig. 3. The word w = c ∈ Σ∗1 is the shortest
of the synchronizing words of A and the automaton is a
synchronizing automaton w.r.t. the initial state.
0 1
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Fig. 3: Example 2: Synchronizing automaton A
Proposition 1 demonstrates some properties of synchroniz-
ing automata w.r.t. the initial state, regarding their languages,
adapted from [16].
Proposition 1. Let G = ( ,Σ, , q0, ) be a synchronizing
automaton w.r.t. the initial state and I 6= ∅. Then:
a) L(G)IL(G) ⊆ L(G);
b) L(G)ILm(G) ⊆ Lm(G);
c) Lm(G)ILm(G) ⊆ Lm(G).
The language Lm(G) is called a synchronizing language.
Proof. Any word s ∈ L(G) leads to a state q (q0.s = q) that,
when followed by a word w ∈ I , reaches state q0 (q.w = q0),
from Definition 3. So, ∀s ∈ L(G), ∀w ∈ I q0.sw = q0.
a) Let s ∈ L(G), and w ∈ I , then:
sw ∈ L(G)I ⊆ L(G)
and q0.sw = q0. We also know that, for any automaton
G, LG(q0) = L(G) and we can concatenate L(G) to
both sides and find:
swL(G) ⊆ L(G)IL(G) ⊆ L(G)L(G). (2)
(2) becomes:
L(G)IL(G) ⊆ L(G). (3)
proving a).
b) Let u ∈ L(G), and w ∈ I , then:
uw ∈ L(G)I
and q0.uw = q0. We also know that, for any automaton
G, LG(q0)∩Lm(G) = Lm(G). So we can concatenate
Lm(G) to uw and:
uwLm(G) ⊆ L(G)ILm(G)
Since ∀s ∈ L(G)I , q0.s = q0, then:
uwLm(G) ⊆ L(G)ILm(G) ⊆ Lm(G).
proving b).
c) Given that:
Lm(G) ⊆ L(G)
we have:
Lm(G)ILm(G) ⊆ Lm(G).
5A synchronizing automaton w.r.t. the initial state is syn-
chronizing to any state if it is also accessible, given that it is
always possible to lead any state to the initial state and then
to any other state.
Corollary 1. If G = (Q, , , q0, ) is a synchronizing au-
tomaton w.r.t. the initial state and every state ofG is accessible
then:
a) G is a synchronizing automaton w.r.t. any state q′ ∈ Q;
b) G is coaccessible.
Proof. If G is synchronizing w.r.t. the initial state then there
is a set I 6= ∅ such that
L(G)IL(G) ⊆ L(G),
from (Proposition 1). If G is accessible, for every state q ∈ Q
there is at least a word u ∈ L(G) such that:
q0.u = q (4)
and since I 6= ∅, from any state q′ ∈ Q, q′.w = q0, with
w ∈ I . From (4), we know that q′.wu = q. Then,Q.wu = {q},
wu ∈ I and G is synchronizing w.r.t. state q, showing item
a). If G is accessible, every state q ∈ Qm ⊆ Q is reachable
from the initial state, q0.u = q, with u ∈ Lm(G). If G is
synchronizing, then there exists w ∈ I such that q.w = q0
and from q0 all states are reachable. Then, we can conclude
that G is coaccessible, showing item b).
B. Operations with Synchronizing Automata
In general, it makes little sense, in the Supervisory Control
Theory, to expect a supervisor to be synchronizing when the
automata that originate that supervisor are not. So, our strategy
is to model the system and specification as synchronizing
automata and see under what conditions the synchronization
word survives the synthesis procedure. In this context, it is
important to analyze how the synchronizing word survives the
parallel composition of synchronizing automata.
Lemma 1. Let L ⊆ Σ∗1 be a synchronizing language and I be
the set of all synchronizing words w.r.t. the initial state of L
and P : Σ∗ → Σ∗1, Σ1 ⊆ Σ then P
−1(L) is a synchronizing
language.
Proof. To show that P−1(L) is a synchronizing language, we
must show that ∃IK , such that P−1(L)IKP−1(L) ⊆ P−1(L).
Since L is a synchronizing language, then LIL ⊆ L (Propo-
sition 1). Applying the inverse projection to both sides:
P−1(LIL) ⊆ P−1(L)
We can decompose the left side of the expression, resulting
in:
P−1(L)P−1(I)P−1(L) ⊆ P−1(L)
replacing P−1(I) = IK and P
−1(L) = B we have:
BIKB ⊆ B.
So, B = P−1(L) is a synchronizing language.
In the context of automata, the inverse projection creates
self-loops in all states for each symbol in Σ2 \ Σ1. It is
easy to see that this operation does not turn a synchronizing
automaton unsynchronizing, but only increases the number of
synchronizing words.
Example 3. Let A = ( ,Σ1, , , ) be the synchronizing
automaton w.r.t the initial state previously presented in Fig.3,
Σ1 = {a, b, c} and Σ = {a, b, c, x}. Consider the natural
projection P : Σ → Σ1. In Fig.4, an automaton that models
the language P−1(Lm(A)) is shown. It is easy to see that
any word in IP = (Σ \ Σ1)∗c(Σ \ Σ1)∗c∗(Σ \ Σ1)∗ =
x∗cx∗c∗x∗ ∈ Σ∗ is a synchronizing word w.r.t. the initial state
of the resulting automaton.
0 1
c, x
c
b
a x
Fig. 4: Example 3: Synchronizing automaton w.r.t. the initial
state, modeling the inverse projection of the machine A to Σ.
From the definition of the inverse projection, we can con-
clude that I ⊂ IK , so every synchronizing word of L is also
a synchronizing word of P−1(L).
Now we deal with the intersection operator.
Lemma 2. Let L1, L2 ⊆ Σ∗ be synchronizing languages. Let
I1, I2 be, respectively, the sets of synchronizing words of their
original automata. If I1∩I2 6= ∅, then the nonempty language
K = L1 ∩ L2 is a synchronizing language and its automaton
is synchronizing w.r.t. the initial state.
Proof. From Proposition 1, we have that:
L1I1L1 ⊆ L1 (5)
L2I2L2 ⊆ L2. (6)
for all s ∈ L1 ∩ L2 and w ∈ I1 ∩ I2 is straightforward that
sws ∈ L1I1L1 and sws ∈ L2I2L2, so:
sws ∈ L1I1L1 ∩ L2I2L2. (7)
(7) can be rewritten as:
sws ∈ (L1 ∩ L2)(I1 ∩ I2)(L1 ∩ L2) ⊆ L1 ∩ L2. (8)
then, (L1 ∩L2)I1 ∩ I2(L1 ∩L2) ⊆ L1 ∩L2 and L1 ∩L2 is a
synchronizing language.
Using the last two lemmas, it is possible to define con-
ditions under which the parallel composition maintains the
synchronicity of the original synchronizing automata. This
result is presented in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. Let G1 = (Q1,Σ1, δ1, q01, Qm1) and G2 =
(Q2,Σ2, δ2, q02, Qm2) be synchronizing automata w.r.t. the
initial state and let Σ = Σ1 ∪ Σ2. The resulting automa-
ton G = G1||G2 is synchronizing w.r.t. the initial state if
6P−1
Σ→Σ1
(I1) ∩ P
−1
Σ→Σ2
(I2) 6= ∅, with PΣ→Σi : Σ
∗ → Σ∗i ,
i ∈ {1, 2}.
Proof. Because G1 and G2 are synchronizing w.r.t. the ini-
tial state, we know, using Lemma 1, that the languages
P−1
Σ→Σ1
(Lm(G1)) and P
−1
Σ→Σ2
(Lm(G2)) are also synchroniz-
ing w.r.t. the initial state.
Considering that P−1
Σ→Σ1
(I1) ∩ P
−1
Σ→Σ2
(I2) 6= ∅ and also
that:
Lm(G1||G2) = P
−1
Σ→Σ1
(Lm(G1)) ∩ P
−1
Σ→Σ2
(Lm(G2))
we have, using Lemma 2, that the language Lm(G1||G2) is
a synchronizing language and that G1||G2 is a synchronizing
automaton w.r.t. the initial state.
The next step is to analyze how synchronizing words behave
in the synthesis of controllable and nonblocking supervisors
using the Supervisory Control Theory.
C. Supervisory Control Theory with Synchronizing Automata
The synthesis of a supervisor has 3 main steps: model the
open loop behavior and specifications; compute the desired
language; synthesize the supremal controllable and nonblock-
ing sublanguage. At this point, we assume that we are able to
model and specify using synchronizing automata (we present
how in Section IV-D1).
In the following, we show under what conditions we have
a synchronizing language as a result of the synthesis.
Theorem 1. Let G be a plant and let E be a specification, both
modeled as synchronizing automata w.r.t. the initial state. A
nonempty controllable and nonblocking supervisor S such that
S = SupC(K,G), K = G||E, is a synchronizing automata
w.r.t. the initial state if Σ∗u ∩ I 6= ∅, with I = Synq0(G ‖ E).
Proof. Let K = G ‖ E = (Q,Σ, , q0, Qm) and S =
(Qs,Σ, , q0, Qms), where Qs ⊆ Q and Qms = Qm ∩ Qs.
In the sense of controllability, every state qf ∈ Q \ Qs is a
bad state, because fails the principle of controllability.
Since Σ∗u∩I 6= ∅, there is at least a word w = σ1σ2 . . . σn ∈
Σ∗u ∩ I . There are two possibilities to be considered.
a) the trace w executed from any state q ∈ Q does not visit
a bad state:
If this is the case, since all states of K that are visited
are good states, they will be kept in S. So, w ∈ I is,
also, a synchronizing word of S.
b) the trace w executed from any state q ∈ Q visits a bad
state;
When obtaining S, states of the automaton that imple-
ments K are removed, if they are bad states. If there is a
word w = σ1σ2 . . . σn ∈ Σ∗u ∩ I , where I = Synq0(K),
then every q′ ∈ Q where q′
σ1...σp
−−−−→ qf
σp+1...σn
−−−−−−→ q0 is
also a bad state and is not in Qs, so every state q that
leads to a bad state, using uncontrollable events, is also
removed, then w is completely removed, indicating that
L(S) = {ǫ} and the supervisor is empty.
After the bad states removal, the accessible part of the
resulting automaton is always coaccessible, using Corollary 1,
then nonblocking.
It is straightforward to apply Theorem 1 to the Local
Modular Supervisory Control of DES [29].
Corollary 2. Let Ej be the local specifications of the system
and Gj = ( ,Σj , , , ), be the local plants, with Σuj ⊆
Σj as the uncontrollable events of Gj and j ∈ {1 . . .m}. If
Gj and Ej are synchronizing automata w.r.t. the initial state,
Σ∗uj∩Ij 6= ∅, Ij = Synq0(Gj ‖ Ej) then the local supervisors
Sj are also synchronizing automata w.r.t. the initial state.
Proof. This results follows from the direct application of
Theorem 1 to local specifications and local plants.
Corollary 3 shows that synchronizing local supervisors are
nonconflicting.
Corollary 3. Let Sj be the local supervisors of a sys-
tem, defined as synchronizing automata w.r.t. the initial
state, then these modular supervisors are nonconflicting, so
Lm(||mj=1Sj) = ||
m
j=1Lm(Sj).
Proof. If Sj is synchronizing w.r.t. the initial state, from
Corollary 1, we know Sj is coaccessible and then:
Lm(Sj) = L(Sj). (9)
From Theorem 2, we know that S = ||mj=1Sj is a syn-
chronizing automaton w.r.t. the initial state and is, also,
coaccessible, such that:
Lm(S) = L(S)
replacing S by ||mj=1Sj on both sides:
Lm(||mj=1Sj) = ||
m
j=1L(Sj).
Using (9) we have
Lm(||mj=1Sj) = ||
m
j=1Lm(Sj).
So, the supervisors Sj are nonconflicting.
In the next section synchronization concepts presented so
far are used to implement a recovery procedure for a classical
SCT problem.
D. Synchronization using Recovery Events
In order to integrate the idea of synchronization with the
Supervisory Control Theory, we propose the creation of a
recovery event that connects each state of the plant to the
initial state, including a self-loop in the initial state. Also, if
the specification is of a buffer type, we create a recovery event
to have the buffer move from any state to the initial state. The
same idea can be applied to any other type of specification.
It is important to note that the creation of the recovery
events in a system is only possible when the components of the
system admit a restart procedure regardless their current state.
This restart can be automatic, when the system has a built-
in reset, or manual, when an operator has to manually restart
the system. Although the existence of a restart procedure is
common in many industrial devices, some systems may not
be restarted due to physical restrictions, for instance, systems
7with slow dynamics in which abrupt changes are not possible
(power systems, thermal systems, and so on).
A procedure that turns plant and specification into synchro-
nizing automata is presented next.
1) Modeling: Consider a system composed of machines
M ′i = (Qi,Σ
′
i, δ
′
i, q0i, ), i ∈ {1 . . .m}, and buffer specifi-
cations B′j = (Qj ,Σ
′
j , δ
′
j , q0j , ), j ∈ {1 . . . n}. To turn the
automata into synchronizing automata, the procedure is:
a) For each plant M ′i we redefine it to Mi =
(Qi,Σi, δi, q0i, ) where Σi = Σ
′
i ∪ Σri, Σri = {ri},
and δi as:
δi(q, σ) =
{
q0i if σ = ri
δ′i(q, σ) if σ 6= ri.
b) For each buffer specification B′j we redefine it to Bj =
(Qj ,Σj , δj , q0j , ) where Σj = Σ
′
j ∪ {rBj} and δj as:
δj(q, σ) =
{
q0j if σ = rBj
δ′j(q, σ) if σ 6= rBj .
2) Synthesis: We propose two modifications to the Super-
visory Control Theory, related to the verification of controlla-
bility and nonblockingness under a new partition of the event
set. Instead of partitioning the event set into controllable and
uncontrollable events, we use a third set of events that carries
the recovery events, as in [10]. This modification is justified
because in the controllability analysis we need the recovery
events to behave as uncontrollable events, but we do not desire
that the recovery events take part on the blocking analysis,
because the system may be blocking and this will be detected
only if recovery events are disregarded.
Definition 5. Let G = ( ,Σ, , , ) be a deterministic finite
automaton, synchronizing w.r.t. the initial state, and let Σ =
Σc∪Σu∪Σr, with Σc as the controllable events set, Σu as the
uncontrollable events set and Σr as the recovery events set.
Any word of cardinality n formed as an arrangement, without
repetition, of the set Σr, with n = |Σr| is a synchronizing
word of G.
As established in Proposition 2, the parallel composition
of two synchronizing automata, w.r.t. the initial state, is also
synchronizing when the intersection between their sets of
synchronizing words, when inverse projected to the complete
event set, is nonempty. Such intersection always exists when
using recovery events, as defined in Section IV-D1.
Corollary 4. Let G1 = ( ,Σ1, , , ) and G2 = ( ,Σ2, ,
, ) be synchronizing w.r.t. the initial state and Σ = Σ1 ∪Σ2
and Σr = Σr1∪Σr2, where Σr ⊂ Σ, Σr1 ⊂ Σ1 and Σr2 ⊂ Σ2.
Also, let I1 and I2 be the sets of synchronizing words of G1
and G2, respectively. The resulting automaton G = G1||G2 is
synchronizing w.r.t. the initial state.
Proof. To show that automaton G = G1||G2 is synchronizing
w.r.t. the initial state it is enough to show that P−1
Σ→Σ1
(I1) ∩
P−1
Σ→Σ2
(I2) 6= ∅, (Proposition 2), PΣ→Σi : Σ
∗ → Σ∗i , i ∈
{1, 2}.
Let perm(Σa,Σb) = {s : s ∈ Σ∗a ∧ ∀σ ∈
Σb, |PΣa→{σ}(s)| = 1} be a subset of a Σ
∗
a where every event
in Σb occurs only once. When Σa = Σb the resulting language
carries the words that are permutations of the events in Σa.
By definition,
perm(Σr1,Σr1) ⊆ I1
perm(Σr2,Σr2) ⊆ I2
and
perm(Σr,Σr) ⊆ perm(Σr,Σr1)
⊆ P−1
Σ→Σ1
(perm(Σr1,Σr1)) (10)
perm(Σr,Σr) ⊆ perm(Σr,Σr2)
⊆ P−1
Σ→Σ2
(perm(Σr2,Σr2)). (11)
If Σr 6= ∅, we have that perm(Σr,Σr) 6= ∅. From (10) and
(11), perm(Σr,Σr) ⊆ P
−1
Σ→Σ1
(I1) ∩ P
−1
Σ→Σ2
(I2). Then, we
can say that G = G1||G2, modeled with recovery events, is
synchronizing w.r.t. the initial state.
Now, it is necessary to redefine nonblockingness and
controllability, since there is a new partition to the events
set (including Σr). When verifying nonblocking, recovery
events are ignored because a blocking behavior should not be
turned into nonblocking by recovery events. When verifying
controllability, the recovery events should be considered as
uncontrollable events, because a recovery event should never
be disabled by the supervisor.
The definition of nonblocking for systems with recovery
events is given in Definition 6.
Definition 6. Let G = ( ,Σ, , , ) be a deterministic finite
automata, synchronizing w.r.t. the initial state, with Σr ⊆ Σ.
G is nonblocking if:
L(G) ∩ (Σ \ Σr)
∗ = Lm(G) ∩ (Σ \ Σr)∗
The modified definition of controllability is presented in
Definition 7.
Definition 7. Let G = ( ,Σ, , , ) be a deterministic finite
automata, synchronizing w.r.t. the initial state, so its event set
can be partitioned into Σ = Σc ∪Σu ∪ Σr. A language K ⊆
Lm(G) is controllable if:
K(Σu ∪ Σr) ∩ L(G) ⊆ K.
If K satisfies the condition, then it is controllable, otherwise
the supremal controllable and nonblocking sublanguage can
be synthesized. Theorem 1 is reformulated in Corollary 5.
Corollary 5. Let G = ||mi=1Mi and E = ||
n
j=1Bj , modeled
as synchronizing automata w.r.t. the initial state, as in Section
IV-D1. Let I be the set of synchronizing words of K = G||E,
if (Σu ∪ Σr)∗ ∩ I 6= ∅ then a nonempty controllable and
nonblocking supervisor S, synthesized from G and E is, also,
a synchronizing automata w.r.t. the initial state.
8Proof. Using the modeling approach proposed in Section
IV-D1, recovery events are included in the subsystems and
specifications such that:
I ∩ Σ∗r 6= ∅. (12)
From Definition 7 we know that the recovery events cannot
be disabled by the supervisor (if that happened the controlla-
bility test would fail). Then, Theorem 1 is valid replacing Σu
with (Σu ∪ Σr) in the statement and in the proof.
In such a case, the condition for the validity of the Theorem
is changed to (Σu ∪ Σr)∗ ∩ I 6= ∅. From (12) we know that
(Σu ∪ Σr)
∗ ∩ I 6= ∅, so the condition is fulfilled and the
supervisor is synchronizing w.r.t. the initial state.
With this approach, a controllable and nonblocking super-
visor is always synchronizing w.r.t. the initial state.
The same approach can be applied to Local Modular Su-
pervisory Control. As presented in Corollary 2, each local
supervisor is controllable and nonblocking. However, even
if the original system is nonconflicting, the nonconflict test
over the supervisors with recovery events is necessary. Since
recovery events do not take part into the nonblockingness
verification, the nonconflicting test of (1) has to be adapted
to ignore recovery events (Definition 8).
Definition 8. Let Sj be the local supervisors of a system,
defined as synchronizing automata w.r.t. the initial state with
event set Σj = Σcj ∪ Σuj ∪ Σrj . These supervisors are
nonconflicting if:
||mj=1Lm(Sj) ∩ (Σj \ Σrj)
∗ = Lm(||mj=1Sj) ∩ (Σ \ Σr)
∗
In manufacturing systems, the recovery events typically
share a transition with uncontrollable events in the plants,
or are in self-loops. The resulting modular supervisors, when
we remove the recovery events, are equal to the modular
supervisors of the system when modeled without recovery
events. When this is the case, a nonconflicting control system
will be nonconflicting after the recovery events are added.
Next section shows a complete example of the application
of synchronizing automata w.r.t. the initial state using recovery
events to recover from a fault when the plant and the super-
visor become unsynchronized.
V. CASE STUDIES
In this section, we show how to model regular DES
problems (the extended small factory [28] and the Flexible
Manufacturing System [30]) as synchronizing automata and
apply the reset procedure proposed in this paper.
A. Extended Small Factory
Consider an extended version of the small factory, com-
posed of three machines and two unity buffers, Fig. 5.
Originally, each machine is modeled by an automaton M ′i =
( ,Σi, , , ), i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, with 2 states (idle and working)
and 2 transitions (start and finish). The unity buffers are also
M1 B1 M2 B2 M3
a1 b1 a2 b2 a3 b3
Fig. 5: Extended small factory diagram.
0 1
ai
bi
(a) M ′i , i ∈ {1, 2, 3}
E F
bi
ai+1
(b) B′j , j ∈ {1, 2}
Fig. 6: Original automata modeling the extended small factory.
modeled with automata B′j , j ∈ {1, 2}, with two states and
two transitions (Figure 6).
First, the automata of Fig. 6 are transformed into
synchronizing automata w.r.t. the initial state, by adding
recovery events ri and rBj to the models, such that
each automaton is brought to the initial state when their
synchronizing word is executed, as described in Section
IV-D1.
In Fig. 7 the model of each part of the system and the shortest
synchronizing word of each machine are shown. The shortest
synchronizing word is the trace ri ∈ Σ
∗
ri for each plant and
rBj ∈ Σ
∗
Bj
for each specification.
0 1
ai
bi
ri
ri
(a) Mi
E F
bj
aj+1
rBj
rBj
(b) Bj
Fig. 7: Synchronizing automaton Mi, i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, with wi =
ri ∈ I1, and Bj , j ∈ {1, 2}, wBj = rBj .
Each local plant Gj = Mj||Mj+1, j = {1, 2}, is also
a synchronizing automaton w.r.t. the initial state, Gj =
( ,Σj ∪ Σj+1 ∪ {rj , rj+1}, , , ), with shortest synchro-
nization word wj ∈ {rjrj+1, rj+1rj}. For G1 (Fig. 8(a)),
w1 ∈ {r1r2, r2r1} and for G2 (Fig. 9(a)), w2 ∈ {r2r3, r3r2}.
We propose to execute a synchronizing word of the super-
visor, that includes the recovery events of the plant, in order
to recover the system. It is straightforward that any word that
brings each original automaton, inverse projected to the same
event set (union of all sets), to their initial states, leads the
composition to its initial state. So, consider a synchronization
word of S1, w1 = r1r2rB1 . If we execute w1 in S1, Fig.8(b),
regardless the original state, we will reach the initial state.
Moreover, any synchronizing word, built for S1 resets also
its correspondent local plant and buffer. If we run w1 in G1
(Fig.8(a)), and its corresponding natural projections in M1,
M2 and B1 (Fig.7(a) and (b)) it will lead us to the initial
state.
Now, we show how the desynchronization may happen and
how to use the synchronizing word to solve it. If a sequence
s = a1 b1 a2 a1 b2a3 ∈ S1||S2 is executed, states (10) of
G1 and (10E) in S1 are reached. Consider now that event
900
11
1001
r1
r2r1
r2
r1 r2
r1, r2
a1
b1
a2
b2b1
a1
b2
a2
(a) G1 = M1||M2, with a (not unique) shortest synchronizing word
w1 = r1r2.
00E
00F 01F
01E 11E
10E
r1, r2, rB1
a1
r1
r2, rB1
b2, r2
rB1
b1
r1, r2
rB1
b2, r2
r1
rB1
b1
r1, rB1
a1
r1
b2, r2
a2
(b) Resulting supervisor S1, with a (not unique) shortest synchronizing
word w = r1r2rB1 .
Fig. 8: Plant G1 and supervisor S1, obtained for the Extended
Small Factory of Fig. 5.
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(a) G2
00E
00F 01F
01E 11E
10E
r2, r3, rB2
a2
r2
r3, rB2
b3, r3
rB2
b2
r2, r3
rB2
b3, r3
r2
rB2
b2
r2, rB2
a2
r2
b3, r3
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(b) S2
Fig. 9: Plant G2 = M2||M3 with synchronizing word w =
r2r3 and supervisor S2 with synchronizing word w = r2r3rB2
b1 happens in the plant but the supervisor does not observe
it (a malicious agent has hidden such occurrence from the
control). Automaton G1 would move to state (00), and S1
would stay at (10E), since b1 is not observed. At this point, the
system and control are desynchronized. Supervisor S1 disables
a2 in state (10E) until b1 is observed and a1 is considered
by the supervisor as not possible and the control systems
reaches a deadlock. If we apply a synchronizing word of S1,
w = r1r2rB1 , S1 and G1 will move to the initial state.
Next, we analyze the effect that resynchronizing S1 and
G1 causes in S2 and G2. The word w = r1r2rB1 , resets M2
that is a system that is shared by G1 and G2. Supervisor S2
and plant G2 will see w
′ = r2 and will be kept in the same
state (selfloops with r2 in states (01) of G2 and (01E) of S2),
namely the recovery is localized for S1 and G1 and S2 and
G2 are kept as before.
In the following, we present a case study of a Flexible
Manufacturing System (FMS), that illustrates the application
of the security recovery procedure in a larger system.
B. Flexible Manufacturing Systems
The Flexible Manufacturing System (FMS) [30] is com-
posed of eight machines: three conveyors (C1, C2 and C3), a
mill, a lathe, a robot, a painting device (PD) and an assembly
machine (AM), as shown on Figure 10.
The automata for the subsystems, modeled as synchronizing
automata w.r.t. the initial state with reset event, are shown in
Figure 11. The safety specifications, that restrict the system to
avoid underflow and overflow in the buffers, are presented in
Figure 12.
A total of 15 recovery events were created, one event for
each plant and specification. Monolithic and Local Modular
Supervisory Control were applied in order to obtain a set of
controllable, nonblocking and nonconflicting supervisors. The
synthesis of supervisors was done using software UltraDES
[31]. The classical algorithms were adapted to cope with
conditions of Corollary 5 and Definition 8.
The application of the monolithic approach leads to a single
supervisor with 70, 272 states, 1, 434, 804 transitions, being
C2
C1 B1
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B3
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B6
B7
B8
C3
Robot
Lathe
Mill
AM
PD
11
21
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31
33
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81
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72
32
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30
74
71
61
63
65
64
66
Fig. 10: Diagram of the Flexible Manufacturing System
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Fig. 11: Models of the plants of the Flexible Manufacturing System
1, 054, 080 of these transitions triggered by reset events. The
shortest synchronizing word has 16 events and, if used, will
reset the system (all equipment and supervisors) to the initial
state.
Using the same automata of figures 11 and 12, the resulting
supervisors are conflicting (as they were in the solution
without reset events). The conflict solution is to compose spec-
ifications E7 and E8 as a single local specification, generating
7 nonconflicting supervisors, as presented in Table I.
TABLE I: Supervisors of the Flexible Manufacturing System
(Sj relates to Ej), |w| is the size of one of the shortest
synchronizing words.
Sup. Plants States Trans. Trans. Σr |w|
S1 C1, Robot 18 94 36 3
S2 C2, Robot 18 94 54 3
S3 Mill,Robot 18 90 54 3
S4 Lathe, Robot 21 105 63 3
S5 Robot, AM 44 253 132 3
S6 Robot, AM 44 253 132 3
S7,8 Robot, AM, 260 2441 1560 6
C3, PD
Each supervisor has its own synchronizing words that allow
to recover the whole system applying a partial reset. A
consequence of the partial reset is that the closed loop behavior
after the recovery is not led to the global initial state, but
to an intermediate state where the resetted subsystems are in
the initial states while the rest of the subsystems are kept
untouched.
If a failure happens in one subsystem, the Mill for instance,
the recovery in the two approaches will lead to different
situations. The execution of a monolithic synchronizing word
will take the system to the global initial state. If the Local
Modular Supervisory Control is used, only the synchronizing
word of supervisor S3 has to be run and only the components
(Robot and Mill) are going to be reinitialized. Since the robot
is part of other supervisors, transitions are going to be executed
in each one of the supervisors, in order to resynchronize with
the new state of the robot. The states of the other subsystems
will be kept the same.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper presents a secure recovery procedure based on
concepts of synchronizing automata and Supervisory Control
Theory. This approach can be used to restore systems damaged
by external attacks or temporary unobservability of some
events.
We show under what conditions the synchronicity of the
plants and specifications is inherited by the composed system
and supervisor and expand these results to the Local Modular
Supervisory Control. Then, We present a simple modification
applied to the classical modeling of systems and specifications,
to include recovery events, in order to turn a regular automaton
into a synchronizing one. While the monolithic approach will
lead to a complete reset of the system, the application of the
techniques together with the Local Modular Supervisory Con-
trol allows partial recovery of the system, resetting only the
local plants and supervisors affected by the desynchronization.
Our next steps are to adapt the recovery procedure, allowing
partial resets, even in the monolithic approach; define reset
procedures that do not necessarily lead to the initial state; and
apply the presented recovery techniques to systems that are
already inherently synchronizing.
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